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Abstract: In the U.S. and Europe, prices change somewhere between every six months and 
once a year. Yet nominal macro shocks seem to have real effects lasting well beyond a year. 
"Sticky information" models, as posited by Sims (2003), Woodford (2003), and Mankiw and 
Reis (2002), can reconcile micro flexibility with macro rigidity. We simulate a sticky 
information model in which price setters do not update their information on macro shocks as 
often as they update their information on micro shocks. Compared to a standard menu cost 
model, price changes in this model reflect older macro shocks. We then examine price 
changes in the micro data underlying the U.S. CPI. These price changes do not reflect older 
information, thereby exhibiting a similar response to that of the standard menu cost model.  
However, the empirical test hinges on staggered information updating across firms; it cannot 
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Individual consumer and producer prices change every six months to a year. See Bils and
Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) for U.S.
evidence, and Dhyne, Alvarez, Bihan, Veronese, Dias, Hoﬀman, Jonker, Lunnermann, Rum-
ler and Vilmunen (2005) for a survey of studies on Euro Area countries. In contrast, many
studies ﬁnd that nominal macro shocks have real eﬀects with a half-life well over a year.
See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Romer and Romer (2003), and
Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2004).
“Sticky information” theories can reconcile the macro price rigidity and micro price ﬂex-
ibility. These theories, advanced recently by Sims (1998, 2003), Woodford (2003), and
Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006), feature imperfect information about macro shocks. As a
result, many rounds of micro price changes are needed to fully reﬂect a given macro shock.
In versions such as Sims’, the micro ﬂexibility is at the expense of macro ﬂexibility, as ﬁrms
face convex costs of processing information.
Our aim is to explore whether the tell-tale predictions of sticky information models
are borne out in data on micro price changes. Speciﬁcally, do price changes reﬂect dated
information on macro shocks and macro states? Given the lack of consensus on a measure
of monetary policy shocks, especially one that explains inﬂation movements well, this is not
a straightforward task. We therefore simulate simple general equilibrium models to derive
responses of price changes to past inﬂation movements.
The models we simulate feature exogenous money growth, a cash-in-advance constraint,
and monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. The ﬁrms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks as
well as the aggregate money shocks, but do not change prices every period because they
face costs of implementing price changes (i.e., menu costs). We model sticky nominal prices
alongside sticky information for two reasons. First, 80-90% of prices do not change in the
typical month, an important fact for a monetary business cycle model to match. Second, we
exploit the lumpiness of price changes to test for sticky information. When a ﬁrm changes
its price, we ask, does the change reﬂect only inﬂation innovations since their last price
2change, or does it put weight on older innovations? Related, we can use lumpy price changes
to explore whether ﬁrms that face bigger idiosyncratic shocks (i.e., exhibit larger and more
frequent price changes) update their macro information less frequently. This is precisely the
prediction of Sims’ model of convex costs of processing information: the more micro shocks
ﬁrms have to deal with, the less attention they will pay to macro shocks.
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider a model with ﬂexible information (i.e., constant up-
dating on macro states). We then introduce staggered updating of information on macro
states a la Taylor. As expected, the less frequent the updating of macro information, the
more persistent the real output eﬀects of money shocks. And the stickier the information,
the more individual price changes reﬂect old inﬂation innovations as opposed to recent ones.
We choose several model parameters to match moments in the CPI Research Database
maintained by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. We choose the mean, standard deviation
and serial correlation of money growth in the model to match the mean, standard deviation
and serial correlation of inﬂation in the data. We choose the size of menu costs and the
size of idiosyncratic ﬁrm productivity shocks to match the frequency and size of micro price
changes in the data. Our test is then whether the price changes in the data respond to old
inﬂation innovations, or only those arriving since the ﬁrm last changed its price. In the data,
we ﬁnd little evidence that price changes reﬂect old information. However, the empirical test
hinges on staggered information updating across ﬁrms; it cannot distinguish between a full
information model and a model where ﬁrms have equally old information.
We use the test to examine two additional hypothesis. First, items with large and frequent
price changes (big idiosyncratic shocks) respond strongly to recent information but also to
older information. The ﬁrst pattern is not so consistent with the Sims’ rational inattention
story but the second pattern is. Second, temporary price discounts are often ﬁltered out
on the grounds that they reﬂect idiosyncratic considerations rather than macroeconomic
information. However, we ﬁnd that sales-related price changes respond to macro information
in much the same way that regular price changes do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the general equilib-
3rium models featuring sticky prices (due to menu costs) and exogenously sticky information.
In section 3 we describe the CPI micro dataset, and report statistics that we use to set
parameter values in our models. In section 4 we compare the price changes produced by the
models to those in the CPI microdata. In section 5 we oﬀer tentative conclusions.
2 Model
In order to investigate the role of sticky information in the micro data, we construct a
model with several key features. The basic structure of the model follows from Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987). Households consume a wide variety of goods with a constant elas-
ticity of consumption. Monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce goods to meet demand
at their posted prices. In order to generate a motive for holding money, we assume that
households must pay for their consumption goods in cash before receiving their income. In
order to generate the nominal price rigidities observed in the data, ﬁrms face a “menu”
cost of implementing a price change. To examine the role of sticky information, we assume
that information on the exogenous shocks to the economy arrives in staggered fashion. By
changing sequencing of information arrival we can investigate diﬀerent forms of information
stickiness. Finally, we assume that ﬁrms use a boundedly rational forecast for inﬂation. This
assumption allows us to obtain a nonlinear solution to the model.
2.1 Households
Households consume a variety of m goods and provide labor for production of the goods.









4where the consumption good, Ct, represents an aggregation of individual goods according to












Households make their spending decisions at the beginning of the period before receiving
their income, and we assume that their purchases must be paid for out of money holdings,
Mt. Money holdings can be used to purchase consumption goods and real bonds, Bt:
m  
j=1
Pj,tCj,t + PtBt = Mt. (3)
Real bonds are priced by the cost of purchasing a unit of the aggregate consumption good,











Households receive income at the end of the period in the form of money. Income consists
of wages earned by working for ﬁrms at a per-period wage rate of Wt, proﬁts from their
ownership share of ﬁrms, Πt, returns from bond holdings including a real rate of return, rt,
and lump sum transfers of money from the central bank, Xt+1.1 Income earned in period t
provides the money holdings used for consumption in period t + 1:
Mt+1 = WtLt + Πt + Pt (1 + rt)Bt + Xt+1. (5)
The household budget constraint speciﬁes that money spent on purchases in the current
period does not exceed the money income earned in the previous period. Combining (3) and





Pj,tCj,t + PtBt = Wt−1Lt−1 + Πt−1 + Pt−1 (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + Xt. (6)
The solution to the household’s optimization decision provides the demand function,
real interest rate, and wage rate that will be used by ﬁrms in their dynamic programming
problem. Since the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption is equal
to 1 for households, the real interest rate is constant, r =
1−β
β . The ﬁrst order condition
for consumption of the diﬀerentiated goods can be transformed into the following demand







Households are indiﬀerent between consuming today and saving for consumption in the
next period. We solve for an equilibrium in which households spend all money holdings on
consumption in the current period. Using the cash-in-advance constraint, the demand for a








Finally, using the households’ labor supply decision, we derive an expected real wage
that is constant. Since wage income earned today is not spent until the following period,
households equate the marginal disutility of labor with the discounted expected marginal






















In the economy, there are m monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm produces a
diﬀerentiated good, Yi, using labor input, Li. Producers are assumed to meet all demand at
a given price, implying that Yi = Ci.




Yi − wLi, (11)
where Pi is the price for good i and w is the real wage. The ﬁrm faces the demand function




Here Zi is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, and η governs returns to scale of production,
allowing for decreasing returns due to (say) a ﬁxed factor of production.






























72.2.1 Price adjustment cost
In order to generate nominal price rigidity, we assume that ﬁrms must pay a cost, ψ, in
order to implement a price change. This cost is constant for all ﬁrms and in all periods
and is expressed as a fraction of revenue in the steady-state symmetric equilibrium, where
steady-state (ss) revenue for all ﬁrms is Rss ≡ M
P ss. If ﬁrm i chooses to change its price in
the current period, then net contemporaneous proﬁts, ΠC





























To explore implications of sticky information, we assume that information regarding the
exogenous state variables arrives in a staggered fashion. The two exogenous state variables
in the model are the idiosyncratic proﬁtability shock, Z, and the growth rate of nominal
money supply, gM. Potentially, idiosyncratic information may arrive at a diﬀerent rate than
aggregate information. Through changes in the timing assumptions, we will explore various
forms of sticky information, including some cases in the spirit of rational inattention.
If new information does not arrive in the current period, we assume that the ﬁrm is
not able to determine anything about the realizations of innovations to the exogenous state.
This assumption is similar to claiming that the pricing managers do not interact with the
production managers and the accountants of the ﬁrm, i.e., they do not see how many goods
are produced nor do they observe the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. We make this assumption to keep
the model tractable and to present the starkest implications of sticky information. The
assumption could potentially be relaxed by adding an additional shock to the model such as
measurement error. Firms would then solve a signal extraction problem, as in Lucas (1973),
when they do not have updated information.
Ideally, we would like to specify a model in which ﬁrms face a cost of acquiring information
about the exogenous state variables. In such a model, ﬁrms would make a state-dependent
decision each period regarding whether to pay the costs associated with obtaining updated
8information on the idiosyncratic and/or aggregate shock. The assumption of staggered arrival
of information could potentially be justiﬁed by a model in which the state-dependent decision
on information updating results in a constant updating rule.
Given these information updating assumptions, ﬁrms will receive new information on a
ﬁxed schedule. Let ¯ nA be the number of periods between observing the aggregate money
growth rate, and let ¯ nI be the number of periods between observing the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock. For a given ﬁrm in a given period, let nA represent the number of periods since
aggregate information was last observed, i.e., the age of aggregate information. Similarly,
let nI represent the age of idiosyncratic information. If a ﬁrm has updated information on
both states, then nA = nI = 0.
2.3 Dynamic Optimization Problem
Given the presence of an implementation cost of a price change, the ﬁrm solves a dynamic
optimization problem to maximize proﬁts. In each period the ﬁrm decides whether or not
to adjust its price. If it decides to adjust, it pays the implementation cost and resets its
price. If it does not adjust, its nominal price remains ﬁxed, and its relative price, pi =
Pi
P ,
decreases at the rate of inﬂation.
The state variables of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem are impacted by the timing of
information updating. Given our assumption that ﬁrms are not able to extract any signals
about innovations if information is not updated, this implies that ﬁrms will not be able to
update the endogenous aggregate state variables, inﬂation and real money balances, unless
they received updated information on the money growth rate. The eight state variables are
the ﬁrm’s current nominal price relative to the aggregate price level at the last time that
the aggregate information was observed (pi,−nA), the money growth rate when last observed
(gM,−nA), the inﬂation rate when aggregate information was last observed (π−nA), the level






idiosyncratic productivity index when last observed(Zi,−nI), the age of aggregate information
(nA), the age of idiosyncratic information (nI), and the information set Ω used to form future
9expectations of the endogenous state variables.
Given the state vector, S = {pi,−nA,gM,−nA,π−nA,m−nA,Zi,−nI,nA,nI,Ω}, the ﬁrm max-
imizes the following value function:
V (S) = max(V
C(S),V
NC(S)), (15)
where V C(S) represents the ﬁrm’s value conditional on changing its price and V NC(S) its




























I,Ω′}. The ﬁrm’s value function is dis-
counted by β, reﬂecting the household’s real interest rate.
In order to solve this optimization problem, the ﬁrm must be able to form expectations
over the state variables. In periods in which current information is not observed, the ﬁrm
computes expected proﬁts conditional on the most recent information they have on the state
variables. For example, to form an expectation of the current relative price, pi, the ﬁrm takes
the current nominal price relative to the price level nA periods ago, pi,−nA, and integrates
over all of the possible sequences of inﬂation over nA periods conditional on information in
the state vector. Regardless of the age of the information, the ﬁrm will always need to take
conditional expectations of the future value function. The ﬁrm chooses the nominal price
relative to the price level nA periods ago, p∗
i,−nA, that generates the highest expected value.
The value conditional on no price change is expressed as
V
NC(S) = E−nA,−nI [Πi] + βES′|S [V (S
′)], (17)












For the exogenous state variables, money growth and idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
10we assume autoregressive processes:
gM,t =  gM + ρgMgM,t−1 + νgM,t, νgM ∼ N(0,σ
2
νgM) (18)




In order to compute a fully rational expectation of inﬂation, a ﬁrm needs to know the state
variables of all ﬁrms in the economy, including the joint distribution of relative prices and
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. One way to solve this model would be to introduce restric-
tions that reduce the heterogeneity to a manageable scope, as in Dotsey, King and Wolman
(1999), hereafter DKW. An alternative solution is to assume that ﬁrms form inﬂation expec-
tations based on a limited set of information. We choose the latter solution method for two
reasons. First, the heterogeneity restrictions required for the DKW model do not match up
well with the micro evidence.2. Second, due to the heterogeneity introduced by staggered
updating of information, assuming bounded rationality helps keep the model tractable.




t+1 = α0 + α1πt + α2 lnmt + α3gM,t + νπ,t. (20)
Firms will use the inﬂation forecast along with the forecast of money growth, from (18), to










The dynamic system used for forming aggregate expectations can be expressed as a






































t+1 = a0 + a1πt + a2 lnmt + a3gM,t + νπ,t+1 (23)
lnm
f
t+1 =  gM − a0 − a1πt + (1 − a2)lnmt + (ρgM − a3)gM,t (24)
+νgM,t+1 − νπ,t+1
gM,t+1 =  gM + ρgMgM,t + νgM,t+1 (25)
The equilibrium solution of the model requires the selection of an appropriate inﬂa-
tion forecast rule, Θ = {α1,α2,α3}. Using this forecast rule, the ﬁrm will solve the op-
timization problem in (15) by determining a policy function for the updating of prices:
p∗
i,−nA = f (pi,−nA,gM,−nA,π−nA,m−nA,Zi,−nI,nA,nI,Ω).
The recursive equilibrium of the model consists of the functions V and f along with the
inﬂation forecast rule, Θ, such that (i) V and f solve the ﬁrm’s optimization problem and (ii)
the expected inﬂation dynamics from the forecast rule matches the actual inﬂation dynamics
resulting from ﬁrms’ pricing decisions in a simulated economy.
2.3.2 Calibration and Simulation
Due to the presence of a discrete-choice decision in the optimization problem expressed in
(15), the model is solved numerically using value function iteration. In this solution, all
state variables are placed on discrete grids. The bounds of the relative price state are set
wide enough to include all optimal pricing decisions, and prices are placed on the grid in
increments of 0.4%, or about half the steady state inﬂation rate for this economy. The
12autoregressive process for idiosyncratic productivity is transformed into a discrete-valued
Markov chain following Tauchen (1986).3 This conversion provides us with the transition
matrix expressing the expected probability of any given realization of Zt+1 as a function of
the current state variables Zt. The three-variable VAR for inﬂation, real money balances,
and money growth is similarly converted into a ﬁrst-order Markov chain.4 These transition
matrices are used to compute the discounted expected value of the future period as well as
expected contemporaneous proﬁts if ﬁrms have out-of-date information.
Regarding information updating, there are two transition matrices for the respective
updating of aggregate information and idiosyncratic information. For aggregate information,
the transition matrix ΦA (nA,n′
A) provides the probability of moving from information of age
nA in the current period to information of age n′
A next period. A similar transition matrix,
ΦI (nI,n′
I), exists for idiosyncratic information. The parametrization of these matrices will
determine the stickiness of information.
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model to approximate several features of
the BLS microdata that will be described in the next section. Table 1 displays the parameter
values. A trimester frequency is used for the model in order to match up with the sampling
frequency studied in the data. Therefore, we set the discount rate, β, equal to 0.96
1
3. The
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent consumer goods, θ, is set at 5, corresponding
to a 25 percent markup for the ﬁrm. The implementation cost of a price change is set
at 1.1 percent of revenue to induce a frequency of adjustment similar to the micro data.
The parameters for the money growth process, ρgM and σgM, are set to produce inﬂation
dynamics similar to the data. A random walk turns out to be a good approximation. The
idiosyncratic productivity shock parameters, ρZ and σZ, are based on estimates in Klenow
and Willis (2006) and the BLS facts reported below. Finally, the parameter κ, which is the
marginal disutility of labor divided by the discount rate, is set at 0.5. The results of interest
from the model are not sensitive to changes in κ.
3The discrete grid for idiosyncratic productivity contains 5 points spread equally in terms of the cumu-
lative distribution function of the variable.
4The discrete grids for inﬂation, real money balances, and money growth contain 11, 7, and 5 points,
respectively, spread equally in terms of the cumulative distribution function of the variables.










Following Willis (2003), the inﬂation forecasting rule expressed in (20) is used to compute
a rational expectations equilibrium of the model. For a given speciﬁcation of the structural
parameters of the model along with the inﬂation forecasting parameters, Θ = {α1,α2,α3},
the model is solved and the policy function is generated. A panel of 6,000 ﬁrms over 51
trimesters is then simulated using the policy functions.5
Simulating data from the model requires an updating process to determine the evolution
of the endogenous aggregate-level state variables. The aggregate inﬂation rate and the level
of real money balances are determined by the collective actions of ﬁrms in the simulation.
When setting prices in the current period, ﬁrms with updated information, nA = 0, possess
the current value of inﬂation and real money balances. To determine the current-period
inﬂation rate while simulating the model, which in turn determines the level of real money
balances using equation (21), we locate the grid point in the discretized inﬂation state space
that most closely matches equation (4), where the inﬂation rate is combined with P−1 to get
P.
After simulating the full panel, we evaluate the forecasting rule used to form expectations
5The size of the panel was chosen to capture two features. First, the panel should have a large number of
ﬁrms given the large number of price observations by the BLS. We found increasing the number of ﬁrms above
6,000 did not alter the results in any signiﬁcant fashion. Second, the number of periods should match the
length of the BLS sample, namely 51 trimesters. To replicate the panel for model moments, we lengthened
the number of periods and then divided them into subsamples.
14of inﬂation. An OLS regression of the linear forecasting rule in (20) is executed on the
simulated data using the simulated values for inﬂation, real money balances, and money
growth. The initial assumed values of the forecast parameters, Θ0, are then compared to the
OLS estimates, Θ1. If these values diﬀer, then the forecast parameters are updated based on
Θ1 and a new solution for the model is derived. This updating process continues until a ﬁxed
point is reached. This ﬁxed-point solution represents a rational expectations equilibrium
where the inﬂation forecasting rule assumed by ﬁrms matches up with the behavior of the
simulated data.6
2.3.3 Sticky Information
We ﬁrst consider a model in which aggregate information arrives in a deterministic fashion.
The setting for ¯ nA provides the interval between updates of information. The updating
across ﬁrms will be staggered so that a constant fraction of ﬁrms receive new information
each period. To illustrate the deterministic updating of information, the transition matrix
for the case with ¯ nA = 2 is shown below, where the rows represent the age of information





A) = 0 0 1
1 0 0
To illustrate the features of information stickiness, we will consider four cases corresponding
to the maximum age of aggregate information ranging from 0 to 3 periods, ¯ nA ∈ {0,1,2,3}.
In terms of idiosyncratic information, we assume that ﬁrms always have current infor-
mation on their idiosyncratic shocks (¯ nI = 0). This assumption allows us to focus on the
implications of aggregate information stickiness.
6Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we plan to explore whether the inclusion of additional variables
into the forecasting rule will lead to a signiﬁcant improvement in the inﬂation forecast. Candidate variables
include additional lags of the state variables and moments of the price distribution.
15To illustrate the role of sticky information, Figures 1 and 2 display the impulse responses
of inﬂation and output to a 1 percent shock to the money growth rate. As shown in Figure 1,
an increase in information stickiness leads to a delayed, hump-shaped response of inﬂation.
The delayed inﬂation response suggests that there will be a stronger output response for
sticky information models than for the baseline model. This pattern is clearly observed in
Figure 2.
It is important to note that each of the four cases has a slightly diﬀerent equilibrium inﬂa-
tion forecast rule. The parameters of the inﬂation forecast rule, equation (20), for each case
are displayed in Table 2. The coeﬃcients vary only somewhat, but the explanatory power of
this forecast rule when estimated on simulated data increases dramatically when information
is sticky. This suggests that this simple forecast rule for inﬂation is more reasonable for a
model with sticky information than for a model with full information.
Table 2: Equilibrium forecast rules for model with sticky information updating
Model a1 a2 a3 R2
Baseline (¯ nA = 0) -0.04 0.50 0.08 0.10
Sticky 1 (¯ nA = 1) 0.01 0.49 0.16 0.73
Sticky 2 (¯ nA = 2) -0.03 0.47 -0.05 0.76
Sticky 3 (¯ nA = 3) -0.05 0.36 -0.03 0.67


























































As an alternative model of information stickiness, we also consider an economy in which all
ﬁrms have equally old information. This assumption approximates a model in which infor-
mation processing costs are such that it takes ﬁrms several periods to discern an aggregate
shock. In our model, this would be represented as a case where ﬁrms always have aggregate
information that is ¯ nA periods old.
As before, we will consider four diﬀerent information assumptions. In the baseline model,
ﬁrms always have current information. In the second case, ﬁrms always have aggregate
information that is 1 period old. This diﬀers from the previous model in that ﬁrms are now
restricted so that they never possess current information, whereas in the sticky information
model, half of ﬁrms possess current information and half possess information that is 1 period
old. We also consider cases in which information is 2 and 3 periods old, respectively. Table 3
displays the equilibrium inﬂation forecast parameters. All of the coeﬃcients change with the
age of information, and the explanatory power of this equation on simulated data is strongest
when information is 1 period old. This makes intuitive sense the forecast rule only contains
information lagged one period, and it suggests that additional information lags should be
added to the cases with older information. However, since each additional lagged variable
becomes a state variable for the optimization problem, we cannot maintain tractability of
the solution with an expanded forecast rule.
Table 3: Equilibrium forecast rules for model with old information
Model a1 a2 a3 R2
Baseline (nA = 0) -0.04 0.50 0.08 0.10
Old 1 (nA = 1) -0.04 0.50 0.08 0.91
Old 2 (nA = 2) -0.34 0.39 -0.24 0.68
Old 3 (nA = 3) -0.21 0.26 -0.11 0.35
In future research, we also plan to explore another form of sticky information in which
there is heterogeneity in the maximum age of information that is related to heterogeneity
19in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks and the size of implementation costs. This distinc-
tion is intended to approximate a model of rational inattention where ﬁrms that face larger
idiosyncratic shocks choose to spend more eﬀort processing idiosyncratic as opposed to ag-
gregate information. In our setup, this can be modelled by modifying ¯ nA and ¯ nI so that
ﬁrms that face larger idiosyncratic shocks “choose” to update idiosyncratic information more
frequently and aggregate information less frequently. A high value of the implementation
cost leads to less frequent updating of both information processes because the marginal value
of new information decreases as implementation costs increase. Preliminary investigation of
this model shows that the frequency of adjustment is a key element in determining whether
rational inattention of this form can deliver results similar to Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2005). If ﬁrms update aggregate information frequently but they do not adjust because of
implementation costs, then these ﬁrms may respond to aggregate shocks with an even longer
delay than ﬁrms that update aggregate information less frequently but adjust prices more
frequently.
3 CPI Data
For producing the Consumer Price Index, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics conducts
a monthly Commodities and Services Survey. This Survey covers all types of consumer
products and services other than shelter, or around 70% of consumer spending. About
85,000 items are surveyed each month, with an item being a speciﬁc product (brand and
detailed features) sold by a particular outlet. The data are collected from around 20,000
outlets located mostly in 45 large urban areas.
The CPI Research Database, maintained by the BLS Division of Price and Index Number
Research, contains all prices in the Commodities and Services Survey from January 1988 to
the present.7 We base our statistics on data through December 2004. The BLS tracks
individual items for about ﬁve years, aﬀording many opportunities to observe price changes.
7See Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) for a more detailed description of the CPI Research Database.
20The BLS labels each collected price as either a “regular” price or a “sale” price (i.e., a
temporarily low price). Although sales may entail menu costs, Golosov and Lucas (2003) and
others have argued that one should focus on regular prices for macro questions. We therefore
report results for both regular prices and all posted prices. To construct a continuous series
of regular prices, we substitute the most recent regular price whenever the current price
is a sale price. To minimize the importance of measurement error, we drop price changes
that exceed 10 natural log points in absolute value. These price jumps constitute less than
one-tenth of one percent of all price changes.
The BLS collects prices monthly for food and energy items in all areas, and monthly for all
items in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. For other areas, they check prices bi-monthly
for “core” items (items other than food or energy). Each bi-monthly item is either odd
(checked in months 1=January, 3=March, 5=May, 7=July, 9=September and 11=November)
or even (checked in months 2=February, 4=April, 6=June, 8=August, 10=October, and
12=December). To use all items from all areas, and yet have a single frequency, we construct
a “trimester” dataset. The ﬁrst trimester is months 1-4 (January-April), and contains prices
from January for “odds” and February for “evens”. The second trimester (months 5-8,
or May-August) includes May prices for odds and June prices for evens. Finally, the third
trimester (months 9-12, or September-December) has September prices for odds and October
prices for evens. We label half the monthly items odds and half evens, and follow a subset
of their prices accordingly. The disadvantage of looking at trimesters is that we are ignoring
price quotes in months 3, 7 and 11 for odds and months 4, 8 and 12 for evens. Yet in so
doing we incorporate the 85,000 items coming from all areas. If we were to stick with a
monthly dataset, in contrast, we would have only around 14,000 items from the top 3 cities.
Just as important, looking at trimesters rather than months allows us to consider models
with greater stickiness of information without adding as many states (e.g., three trimesters
as opposed to three months).
To help pin down key parameters in our model, we calculate ﬁve statistics from the CPI
data. Three of the moments are the mean, standard deviation, and serial correlation of the
21aggregate trimester inﬂation rate. In terms of our model, these can be thought of as helpful
for setting the mean, standard deviation, and serial correlation of money growth. The other
two statistics are the median frequency of price changes and the median size of price changes.
These two moments guide our choices for the size of menu costs and the size of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks.
To deﬁne the statistics precisely, let Psit denote the price of item i in sector s in trimester
t, and ωsit the BLS weight on item i within category s in trimester t. The weights in sector
s sum to ω95
s in every trimester, the BLS consumption expenditure weight of category s in








We then take the simple average across the 50 trimesters from 1988 through 2004 to arrive





In similar fashion we calculate the standard deviation (0.482%) and serial correlation
(0.163) of the inﬂation rate:
σπ =
   
   
50  
t=1
(πt −  π)2/49 = 0.00482.
ρπ =





(πt −  π)(πt−1 −  π)/48 = 0.163.
Our fourth moment is the frequency of items changing price from one trimester to the
next. Let I(∆Psit  = 0) be a price-change indicator for item i in sector s in trimester t. It
takes on the value 1 if the item changed price from trimester t − 1 to t, and 0 otherwise.
We calculate the mean value of this indicator for an item, then take the weighted median
22value across items to arrive at 0.357 (35.7% per trimester). Easier to express explicitly is
the cousin of this statistic, namely the weighted mean frequency of price changes, which is
higher at 43.5%:
















ωsit. We prefer the median to the mean because, in time-dependent models at
least, the median appears to provide a better approximation to a model with heterogeneity.
Bils and Klenow (2004) examine this for the Taylor model, and Carvalho (2006) for the
Calvo model.
Our ﬁfth and ﬁnal moment is the median absolute size of price changes, which is 0.0795












I(∆Psit  = 0)
= 0.121.
As stressed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Golosov and Lucas (2003), absolute price
changes are much larger than needed to keep up with the trend inﬂation rate. The trend is
about 0.8% per trimester and the frequency of price changes is around 1/3, so price changes
only need average about 2.4% to keep up with trend inﬂation. Yet the average price change
is ﬁve times as large at 12%. These large price changes do not merely reﬂect diﬀerent sectoral
mean inﬂation rates, as Klenow and Kryvtsov report large price movements even relative
to a sectoral price index deﬁned for 200-300 separate categories of consumption. Given the
relative stability of the aggregate inﬂation rate, idiosyncratic shocks will need to be large to
generate such price changes in our model. Such idiosyncratic shocks will dominate individual
ﬁrm decisions about when and how much to change prices, with aggregate conditions of less
importance. As discussed earlier, ﬁrms might be rationally inattentive to aggregate state
variables, preferring to focus on the ﬁrst order idiosyncratic shocks.
In Table 4, nearby, we summarize these moments. We also give the corresponding mo-
ments in our baseline model. We chose the parameter values in our baseline model to roughly
23match these moments.8
Table 4: Moments
 π σπ ρπ I(∆P  = 0) |∆P|
BLS CPI Data 0.00805 0.00482 0.136 0.357 0.0795
Baseline Model 0.00810 0.00457 0.142 0.347 0.0830
4 Simulation and Estimation
One way to investigate the plausibility of a sticky information model is devise a test that
reveals the extent to which ﬁrms respond to current versus lagged information. In terms of
the state-dependent model presented here, we can precisely derive the price change of ﬁrms
as a function of variables in their information set.













where α is the probability of a ﬁrm changing its price. Here we make a simplifying assump-
tion that the probability of price adjustment is independent of the time since the previous
change. This assumption matches the ﬂat hazard rate found in the micro data by Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2005). It also is a reasonable approximation of the hazard function in the
model because the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks dominates the small, but increasing,
incentive to adjust due to the upward drift in the nominal money supply.
8The corresponding moments for posted prices, which include temporary price discounts, are 0.575%
for mean inﬂation, 0.493% for its standard deviation, 0.189 for its serial correlation, 46.7% for the median
frequency of price changes, and 8.91% for the median absolute size of price changes.



























































































Following DKW, we take a total derivative of the optimal pricing equation to show the



















δjEt [(θ − 1)dlnPt+j − dlnMt+j]. (30)
Here we use χ1 ≡
η






. For suﬃciently small rates of steady
state inﬂation, such as in our model, ρj can be approximated by ρj =
βj(1−α)j
PJ−1
h=0 βh(1−α)h and δj is
approximately zero.9
The diﬃculty in using (30) to test the responsiveness of price changes to new versus old
information is that, in the BLS data, we only observe price changes and inﬂation. We do
not observe any disaggregate information nor do we have a good sense of what constitutes
9See the derivation in DKW.
25an aggregate shock for the economy. Ideally, we would like to use an estimated process for
exogenous monetary or technology shocks, and then test to see how long it takes prices to
fully respond to those shocks. However, for most monetary shocks that have been identiﬁed
in the literature, the aggregate price does not begin to respond to the shock until around six
quarters have passed. Technology shocks are also diﬃcult to consider because there is not a
strong consensus on how best to identify them.
Therefore, we propose focusing on the change in price that is directly related to changes
in the aggregate price level. The potential problem with this approach is that we will
be ignoring all other aggregate variables to which ﬁrms may be responding. Ignoring the
idiosyncratic information should not be as problematic because we will be using a large panel
of observations in which idiosyncratic shocks should wash out.
Given that we observe prices that are ﬁxed over discrete intervals, we modify (30) to












where Ξi,t contains the additional terms in (30) not related to the aggregate price level.
Since inﬂation is the only aggregate variable we can use on the actual data, we do not use
the ﬁrms’ forecast rule from the model to evaluate expected changes in the price level in the
simulated data. Instead, we search for an ARMA(p,q) speciﬁcation that best ﬁts simulated
inﬂation dynamics. As a reminder, we consider four cases for the model that diﬀer by the
degree of staggering of aggregate information arrival, ¯ nA ∈ {0,1,2,3}. Across these four
cases, we ﬁnd that an MA(3) speciﬁcation best ﬁts the inﬂation dynamics for the BLS data.
This implies that lnP dynamics are best expressed by
lnPt =   + lnPt−1 + ǫt + δ1ǫt−1 + δ2ǫt−2 + δ3ǫt−3. (32)
where the point estimates and standard errors, in parentheses, are   = 0.008 (0.001), δ1 =
260.13 (0.14), δ2 = 0.21 (0.15), δ3 = 0.25 (0.15), and the adjusted R2 is 0.057.





+χ1χ2 (1 − ρ0)
 
δ1∆τi,tǫt + δ2∆τi,tǫt−1 + δ3∆τi,tǫt−2
 









where ∆τi,tǫt ≡ ǫt − ǫt−τi,t.
To estimate this expression on the simulated data, deﬁne PPCi,t as the predicted price
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Evaluating this expressing using parameters from the model and the estimated MA process
for inﬂation for each respective case of the model, we estimate the following regression on
the simulated data:
∆lnPi,t = γPPCi,t + υi,t.
To reiterate, this speciﬁcation estimates the responsiveness of price changes to new informa-
tion on inﬂation that has arrived since the previous change τi,t periods ago. In the baseline
model, where ﬁrms always have current information on the aggregate state variables, we
should expect an estimate of γ = χ1χ2 = 0.93 if the omitted terms from equation (30) are
27uncorrelated with inﬂation information.
The estimates from the four model cases are displayed in Table 5. The point estimates are
means across 100 samples, and the “standard errors” are the standard deviations across the
100 samples. In the baseline, all ﬁrms have current information on aggregate state variables.
In the case with 1 period of information stickiness (labeled Sticky 1), roughly one-half of
ﬁrms that adjust their price have new information on aggregate state variables and one-half
of ﬁrms have information that is one period old. In the case with 2 periods of information
stickiness (labeled Sticky 2), one-third have new information, and so on. The estimate of γ
in the baseline is 0.60, markedly lower than the expected 0.93. This discrepancy presumably
reﬂects the various approximations we have made. The γ coeﬃcient drops only modestly to
0.55 in Sticky 1, but by a larger amount to 0.37 in the Sticky 3 case. Given that the estimate
of γ diﬀers sharply in the baseline from its theoretical value, this does not appear to be the
best way to gauge whether ﬁrms are fully responding to new information on the price level
since they last changed their price.
The ﬁnal row of Table 5 displays the estimate from the BLS micro data, based on over
one million consumer price changes in the U.S. from 1988 through 2004. The estimate of γ
is 0.76, actually higher than any of our model cases.10
10With posted prices rather than regular prices, there are over 1.4 million price changes. But the ppc
coeﬃcient is very similar at 0.77.
28Table 5a: Response of price changes to price-level information in the sticky information
model
γ R2
Model Baseline (¯ nA = 0) 0.598 0.015
(0.110)
Sticky 1 (¯ nA = 1) 0.554 0.012
(0.092)
Sticky 2 (¯ nA = 2) 0.459 0.008
(0.110)
Sticky 3 (¯ nA = 3) 0.377 0.006
(0.139)
BLS Data 0.764 0.005
(0.010)
Note: The estimated parameter and R2 shown for each model represent the average across
100 simulated panels, where each simulation consists of 6000 ﬁrms estimated for 51 peri-
ods. The standard deviation of the parameter estimate across the 100 panels is shown in
parentheses.
The price responsiveness changes markedly when we switch from a model of sticky infor-
mation to the alternative model where ﬁrms have equally old information. As a reminder,
in this alternative model, all ﬁrms always possess information that is nA periods old. Esti-
mates in Table 5 show that ﬁrms are responding equally to “new” price-level information,
even though the age of information changes for each case. This illustrates the endogeneity
of inﬂation. If all ﬁrms have the same information, even if it is several periods old, they will
still respond to any information updates in a similar way, and thus ﬁrms will appear to be
responding to “new” information in price-level changes. The only way to determine the age
of information would be to estimate the responsiveness to an exogenous shock.
29Table 5b: Response of price changes to price-level information in the old information model
γ R2
Model Baseline (¯ nA = 0) 0.598 0.015
(0.110)
Old 1 (nA = 1) 0.609 0.008
(0.118)
Old 2 (nA = 2) 0.531 0.008
(0.077)
Old 3 (nA = 3) 0.566 0.009
(0.059)
BLS Data 0.764 0.005
(0.010)
Note: The estimated parameter and R2 shown for each model represent the average across
100 simulated panels, where each simulation consists of 6000 ﬁrms estimated for 51 peri-
ods. The standard deviation of the parameter estimate across the 100 panels is shown in
parentheses.
In search of a sharper test for sticky information, we augment the estimation equation
above to include lagged information. If ﬁrms all have current information on the aggregate
state variables, then their price changes should not respond to information on lagged innova-
tions beyond the innovations found in equation (34). However, if ﬁrms set their prices based
on old information, then they should respond to the lagged information. In order to test
this hypothesis, we add four lagged inﬂation innovation terms to the estimation equation:
∆lnPi,t = γPPCi,t + λ1∆τi,tǫt−3 + λ2∆τi,tǫt−4 + λ3∆τi,tǫt−5 + λ4∆τi,tǫt−6 + υi,t. (35)
The results of this estimation for the four cases of the model are displayed in Table 6a.
In the baseline case , where all ﬁrms have current information, the coeﬃcients on lagged
innovations are either insigniﬁcant or negative, indicating that ﬁrms are not responding
positively to old information. However, as the amount of information stickiness is increased
30in cases Sticky 1 through Sticky 3, we ﬁnd that the estimates of λ increase.
The ﬁnal row of Table 6a displays estimates from the BLS data. Here we ﬁnd that the
lagged coeﬃcients are mixed, with two insigniﬁcant, one signiﬁcantly negative, and one (the
oldest) very positive and signiﬁcant. The posted price results (not shown) are much the
same. These results provide modest support for sticky information models.
Table 6a: Response of price changes to new and old price-level information in the sticky
information model
γ λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 R2
Model Baseline (¯ nA = 0) 0.580 -0.028 -0.022 -0.034 0.005 0.016
(0.120) (0.353) (0.289) (0.286) (0.303)
Sticky 1 (¯ nA = 1) 0.540 0.151 0.071 0.100 0.017 0.013
(0.092) (0.313) (0.299) (0.293) (0.309)
Sticky 2 (¯ nA = 2) 0.439 0.523 0.399 0.317 0.221 0.009
(0.114) (0.432) (0.429) (0.484) (0.402)
Sticky 3 (¯ nA = 3) 0.360 0.851 0.543 0.518 0.390 0.006
(0.141) (0.397) (0.444) (0.514) (0.424)
BLS Data 0.763 -0.008 -0.193 -0.042 0.364 0.005
(0.011) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Note: The estimated parameters and R2 shown for each model represent the average across
100 simulated panels, where each simulation consists of 6000 ﬁrms estimated for 51 periods.
The standard deviations of the parameter estimates across the 100 panels are shown in
parentheses.
The results for the alternative model with old information are displayed in Table 6b. The
results show strong responses of prices to old information in the cases with old information.
However, there appears to be no clear pattern for the sign and magnitude of the responses.
The response captured by λ1 is strongly negative, where as λ2 is strongly positive. As dis-
cussed above, the endogeneity of inﬂation appears to limit the eﬀectiveness of this empirical
test for the case in which ﬁrms have equally old information.
31Table 6b: Response of price changes to new and old price-level information in the old
information model
γ λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 R2
Model Baseline (¯ nA = 0) 0.580 -0.028 -0.022 -0.034 0.005 0.016
(0.120) (0.353) (0.289) (0.286) (0.303)
Old 1 (nA = 1) 0.479 -2.510 1.032 -1.301 -0.151 0.063
(0.093) (0.855) (0.591) (0.558) (0.945)
Old 2 (nA = 2) 0.521 -0.570 0.121 -0.175 -0.012 0.012
(0.071) (0.443) (0.383) (0.394) (0.427)
Old 3 (nA = 3) 0.521 -1.990 0.662 -0.819 -0.112 0.034
(0.066) (0.663) (0.541) (0.565) (0.824)
BLS Data 0.763 -0.008 -0.193 -0.042 0.364 0.005
(0.011) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Note: The estimated parameters and R2 shown for each model represent the average across
100 simulated panels, where each simulation consists of 6000 ﬁrms estimated for 51 periods.
The standard deviations of the parameter estimates across the 100 panels are shown in
parentheses.
Thus far, we have tested for the general presence of sticky information. We next modify
this test to explore whether there is evidence for rational inattention in particular. According
to models in which ﬁrms face information processing constraints, one would expect that ﬁrms
facing large idiosyncratic shocks would spend more eﬀort processing idiosyncratic information
and less eﬀort processing aggregate information. In the micro data, we can plausibly test this
theory by splitting the sample into four groups. Group 1 consists of products in the BLS
data that have a below-median frequency of adjustment, I(∆P  = 0)L, and below-median
average absolute size of price changes, |∆P|L. Group 2 consists of products in the BLS data
that have an above-median frequency of adjustment, I(∆P  = 0)H, and an above-median
average absolute size of price changes, |∆P|H. There are over 250,000 price changes in each
group. If ﬁrms setting prices face convex information processing costs, we should expect to
ﬁnd that the products with more frequent and larger price changes respond less strongly to
32new information and more strongly to old information.
The estimation results for these two groups are displayed in Table 6c. The estimate for
the responsiveness to new information, γ, is well below one for Group 1, whereas it is way
above one for Group 2. The coeﬃcients on old information are negative or insigniﬁcant
for Group 1, compared to mostly very positive for Group 2. To us, these results provide
mixed support for rational inattention. Contrary to the theory, the group with less frequent,
smaller shocks responds less to the latest information. Yet consistent with the theory, the
group with the more frequent, larger shocks responds more positively to older information.11
We plan to investigate this issue further, as it could be that shocks common to the Group 2
goods are driving more of the movements in the aggregate inﬂation rate, making it seem as
though these goods are responding more to aggregate information than they are.
Table 6c: Response of price changes to new and old price-level information in BLS
subsamples
γ λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 R2
BLS Data Full Sample 0.763 -0.008 -0.193 -0.042 0.364 0.005
(0.011) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
I(∆P  = 0)L, |∆P|L 0.331 -0.173 -0.001 0.046 -0.104 0.010
(0.007) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) ( 0.020)
I(∆P  = 0)H, |∆P|H 3.856 1.505 0.248 -0.625 1.810 0.015
(0.054) (0.098) (0.114) (0.120) (0.105)
I(∆P  = 0)H, |∆P|L 1.239 -0.048 -0.064 0.029 -0.059 0.013
(0.022) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028)
I(∆P  = 0)L, |∆P|H 0.674 -0.205 -0.314 0.485 -0.079 0.003
(0.028) (0.100) (0.102) ( 0.103) (0.102)
As a ﬁnal test for sticky information, we break price changes into diﬀerent types. We
ﬁrst consider regular price changes vs. sale-related price changes. Golosov and Lucas (2003)
11Results with posted prices are broadly similar.
33and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) focus on regular price changes, i.e., those excluding
temporary price discounts. Their rationale is that sales follow a sticky plan (e.g., 10% oﬀ
Cheerios the ﬁrst weekend of every month), and do not contribute to macro price ﬂexibility.
In our context, such sales should be purely idiosyncratic and unconnected from aggregate
inﬂation. In other words, these price changes should not reﬂect new information on the
aggregate price level. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample of price changes into those
involving only regular prices (both the old and new prices are “regular” prices according to
the BLS) and those involving a sales price (either the old and/or the new price is a “sale”
price according to the BLS). In this breakdown, about 25% of the roughly 1.5 million price
changes are sales-related. Because sales tend to be temporary, they should generate a pattern
of price decreases after longer durations (high τi,t values) and price increases after shorter
durations (low τi,t values), controlling for aggregate inﬂation (the ppc term). We therefore
specify
∆lnPi,t = γ1PPCi,t + γ2τi,t + υi,t.
In the baseline model, we are not sure what to expect for γ2 or how the inclusion of τi,t should
aﬀect γ1. Similarly for regular price changes in the data. But we do expect the sales-related
price changes to exhibit γ1 = 0 and γ2 < 0 in the data.
Table 7 presents results for the baseline model ﬁrst, then results using the BLS data.
Interestingly, in the baseline model we see γ1 > 1 and γ2 < 0. For regular price changes in
the data we see the opposite, namely γ1 < 1 and γ2 > 0. But the results for sales-related
price changes do not entirely conform to expectations either. We do ﬁnd γ2 < 0, as we
expected. But we also ﬁnd γ1 >> 0. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on new information is not far
below that for regular price changes. Thus it appears that sales are just as responsive to
recent inﬂation as are regular price changes. Since sales tend to be temporary, the upshot is
that their declines are not as deep and they give way to higher regular prices when recent
inﬂation has been high. These results appear to undermine the hypothesis that sales do not
reﬂect recent information on the aggregate price level.
34Table 7: Response of sales and substitutions to new price-level information
γ1 γ2 R2
Model Baseline 1.664 -0.010 0.024
(0.196) (0.0017)
BLS Data Full Sample 0.702 0.0022 0.004
(0.021) (0.0001)
BLS Data Regular 0.633 0.0044 0.009
(0.020) (0.0001)
Sales-Related 0.521 -0.0410 0.021
(0.077) (0.0005)
BLS Data Same Product 0.779 0.0024 0.005
(0.021) (0.0001)
Substitution-Related 0.236 -0.0013 0.000
(0.125) (0.0008)
Finally, we split the sample of price changes into those related to product turnover,
or “substitutions” in the BLS vernacular, and those involving precisely the same product.
About 6% of all price changes involve substitutions in the BLS data. Golosov and Lucas
(2003) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) likewise ﬁlter out these price changes. The re-
gression results are in the bottom panel of Table 7. The same product regression looks similar
to the full sample regression, although the coeﬃcient on new information is higher (0.78 vs.
0.70). More striking, substitution-related price changes appear unrelated to recent inﬂation,
or even the duration of the price. This ﬁnding supports the idea that substitutions reﬂect
idiosyncratic or longer-range forces, rather than being responses to recent inﬂation. Bils and
Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁltering out such substitutions
adds a month or two to the typical duration of a price.
355 Conclusion
Researchers are striving to develop micro foundations for apparently long-lasting real eﬀects
of nominal shocks. Nominal rigidities may be an important component, but prices do not
appear to be sticky for long enough to do the job alone. Hence, Sims, Woodford and Mankiw-
Reis have formulated theories in which macro information is stickier than micro prices. In
Sims’ incarnation the two are tightly related: micro shocks demand micro ﬂexibility, thereby
undercutting macro ﬂexibility because of convex costs of processing all types of information.
In this paper we have argued that sticky information theories have testable implications
for micro price changes. We use a simple GE models to demonstrate that the stickier the
information, the older the inﬂation innovations ﬁrms respond to when they change prices.
When we examine price changes in the U.S. CPI-RDB, we ﬁnd little evidence that price
changes reﬂect old information. However, our empirical test hinges on staggered information
updating across ﬁrms; it cannot distinguish between a full information model and a model
where ﬁrms have equally old information.
In addition, we ﬁnd that items with larger, more frequent price changes respond more
to recent information, but also more to older information. This lends only mixed support
to Sims’ hypothesis that the seeds of sticky macro information are sown by ﬂexible micro
information: the more micro shocks ﬁrms have to worry about, the less attention they pay
to macro shocks. And ﬁnally, we ﬁnd that sales-related price changes respond to macro
information in much the same way that regular price changes do. This suggests that tem-
porary price discounts should not be ﬁltered out of data used for analysis of macroeconomic
responsiveness.
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